Worse still, as Jack & I point out here, the economists neglect how their own models of technocratic rule (the modern day form Platonic guardians would take) in fact highlight the inevitability of distributive politics and the ubiquitous opportunity for corruption. If politics is unavoidable, democratic politics is indeed what we need.Well-functioning markets are always embedded within broader mechanisms of collective governance. That is why the world’s wealthier economies, those with the most productive market systems, also have large public sectors.
Once we recognize that markets require rules, we must next ask who writes those rules. Economists who denigrate the value of democracy sometimes talk as if the alternative to democratic governance is decision-making by high-minded Platonic philosopher-kings – ideally economists!
But this scenario is neither relevant nor desirable. For one thing, the lower the political system’s transparency, representativeness, and accountability, the more likely it is that special interests will hijack the rules. Of course, democracies can be captured too. But they are still our best safeguard against arbitrary rule.
\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja\m/ tempurung baja.
Showing posts with label economists. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economists. Show all posts
Monday, May 16, 2011
Democracy & Markets
I recommend this missive from economist Dani Rodrik. Here are some of the good bits:
Sunday, May 15, 2011
Beautiful Science
Q: What are the things you find most beautiful in science?
Science is beautiful when it makes simple explanations of phenomena or connections between different observations. Examples include the double helix in biology, and the fundamental equations of physics.
The opening quotation is a question posed to and answered by physicist Stephen Hawking. You can find an excerpt from the interview here at The Guardian. It brings to mind one of the books that is most influential in my thinking these days, which is by philosopher Hilary Putnam and is entitled The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other Essays.* In the book Putnam argues against subscribing to a view of science (and social science in particular) as sustained by a strict metaphysical dichotomy between facts and values. The world simply does not come pre-packaged in that way. Sure we can draw a distinction between the two for specific purposes in particular situations. But that is that. Against those who seek to inflate some such particular distinction into a full-fledged, comfort affording dichotomy, Putnam offers something of a pincer argument. He suggests that (i) on the one hand, most views of "facts" are sustained by suspect philosophical commitments and (ii) values are plural and that they are entangled with our pursuit of scientific knowledge in complex ways. In particular he suggests that we become less pre-occupied with putatively "moral" or "ethical" values and recognize the ubiquity of cognitive and aesthetic values in science. Hence the way Hawking's comment reverberates: simple explanations are beautiful.__________
* Hilary Putnam. 2004. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Harvard University Press. I will note too that the color scheme of the cover is consistent with other recent works by prominent pragmatists.
Monday, February 28, 2011
Excuse Me Dr. Barro, Your Ideology Is Showing
Economist Robert Barro has published this anti-union Op-Ed in The Wall Street Journal today. Pretty predictably, he wants to blame the fiscal crisis in the states on unions. Is there actual empirical evidence that, as Barro puts it, " the structure of strong public-employee unions . . . helped to create the unsustainable fiscal situation."* It would be nice to see it. The reason why Barro presents none is that, as far as I know, there is none to present. Even an economist should be able to do better than that.
Barro does present some evidence that right-to-work laws promote economic development. There is no real surprise that right to work states attract more robust corporate activity than more union friendly states. Of course they do. Corporate investment go where they don't face any countervailing power. And what about relative wages and benefits in those states? I don't know the empirics in any detail, but I am wagering that there are pretty impressive distributive consequences of disallowing unions. (Have a look at this report from CNN for some initial warrant on that score.) Surely Dr. Barro wouldn't want to discount the massive inequalities that untrammeled corporate power (and markets are meant to be power free zones, no?) generate!
As a theoretical matter Barro presses the claim that "collective bargaining on a broad scale is more similar to an antitrust violation than to a civil liberty." Of course that requires that we ignore the power asymmetries that exist in virtually any labor negotiation between an employer and individual employees. The historical corollary of this theoretical complaint is that Barro seems to want us to head directly back to the late 19th Century, to a time when the state imposed atomization on the labor market and thereby enhanced the power of employers. In other words, Barro doesn't like the way democratic politics has reshaped labor markets by sanctioning collective bargaining. After all, the Wagner Act (1935) cleared Congress and was signed by Roosevelt.
In this essay Barro displays a problem to which economists are quite susceptible: they too readily allow their ideology - usually some facile version of libertarianism - to impede their analysis. We know in general terms what markets (there is no such thing as "the market" except in the world of right leaning ideology) require to work effectively. We know too that allowing collective action can offset biases that prevent effective functioning of markets in atomized settings. There are lots and lots of efficient market outcomes. There is no reason why we ought to opt for the most asymmetrical and unequal of those on offer. At least nothing Barro says here suggests that we should.
__________
* Since he is preoccupied with Wisconsin, is there any evidence that the public employee pension system is in trouble there? Barro implies that it is, but offers not a shred of evidence.
Barro does present some evidence that right-to-work laws promote economic development. There is no real surprise that right to work states attract more robust corporate activity than more union friendly states. Of course they do. Corporate investment go where they don't face any countervailing power. And what about relative wages and benefits in those states? I don't know the empirics in any detail, but I am wagering that there are pretty impressive distributive consequences of disallowing unions. (Have a look at this report from CNN for some initial warrant on that score.) Surely Dr. Barro wouldn't want to discount the massive inequalities that untrammeled corporate power (and markets are meant to be power free zones, no?) generate!
As a theoretical matter Barro presses the claim that "collective bargaining on a broad scale is more similar to an antitrust violation than to a civil liberty." Of course that requires that we ignore the power asymmetries that exist in virtually any labor negotiation between an employer and individual employees. The historical corollary of this theoretical complaint is that Barro seems to want us to head directly back to the late 19th Century, to a time when the state imposed atomization on the labor market and thereby enhanced the power of employers. In other words, Barro doesn't like the way democratic politics has reshaped labor markets by sanctioning collective bargaining. After all, the Wagner Act (1935) cleared Congress and was signed by Roosevelt.
In this essay Barro displays a problem to which economists are quite susceptible: they too readily allow their ideology - usually some facile version of libertarianism - to impede their analysis. We know in general terms what markets (there is no such thing as "the market" except in the world of right leaning ideology) require to work effectively. We know too that allowing collective action can offset biases that prevent effective functioning of markets in atomized settings. There are lots and lots of efficient market outcomes. There is no reason why we ought to opt for the most asymmetrical and unequal of those on offer. At least nothing Barro says here suggests that we should.
__________
* Since he is preoccupied with Wisconsin, is there any evidence that the public employee pension system is in trouble there? Barro implies that it is, but offers not a shred of evidence.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)